By Kai He
Ronald Wittek/EPAThe United States and China remain in a standoff in their tariff war. Neither side appears willing to budge.
After US President Donald Trump
imposed massive 145% tariffs on Chinese imports in early April, China
retaliated with its own tariffs of 125% on US goods.
US Treasury Secretary Scott
Bessent said this week it’s up to China to de-escalate tensions. China’s
Foreign Ministry, meanwhile, said the two sides are not talking.
The prospect of economic
decoupling between the world’s two largest economies is no longer speculative.
It is becoming a hard reality. While many observers debate who might “win” the
trade war, the more likely outcome is that everyone loses.
A
Convenient Target
Trump’s protectionist agenda
has spared few. Allies and adversaries alike have been targeted by sweeping US
tariffs. However, China has served as the main target, absorbing the political
backlash of broader frustrations over trade deficits and economic displacement
in the US.
The economic costs to China are
undeniable. The loss of reliable access to the US market, coupled with mounting
uncertainty in the global trading system, has dealt a blow to China’s
export-driven sectors.
China’s comparative advantage
lies in its vast manufacturing base and tightly integrated supply chains. This
is especially true in high-tech and green industries such as electric vehicles,
batteries and solar energy. These sectors are deeply dependent on open markets
and predictable demand.
New trade restrictions in
Europe, Canada and the US on Chinese electric vehicles, in particular, have
already caused demand to drop significantly.
China’s GDP growth was higher
than expected in the first quarter of the year at 5.4%, but analysts expect the
effect of the tariffs to soon bite. A key measure of factory activity this week
showed a contraction in manufacturing.
China’s economic growth has
also been weighed down by structural headwinds, including industrial
overcapacity (when a country’s production of goods exceeds demand), an ageing
population, rising youth unemployment and persistent regional disparities. The
property sector — once a pillar of the country’s economic rise — has become a
source of financial stress. Local government debt is mounting and a pension
crisis is looming.
Negotiations with the US might
be desirable to end the tariff war. However, unilateral concessions on
Beijing’s part are neither viable nor politically palatable.
Regional
Coordination
Trump’s tariff wars have done
more than strain bilateral relationships; they have shaken the foundations of
the global trading system.
By sidelining the World Trade
Organization and embracing a transactional approach to bilateral trade, the US
has weakened multilateral norms and emboldened protectionist tendencies
worldwide.
One unintended consequence of
this instability has been the resurgence of regional arrangements. In Asia, the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), backed by China and centred
on the ASEAN bloc in Southeast Asia, has emerged as a credible alternative for
economic cooperation.
Meanwhile, the Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) continues to
expand, with the United Kingdom joining late last year.
Across Latin America, too,
regional blocs are exploring new avenues for integration, hoping to buffer
themselves against the shocks of resurgent protectionism.
But regionalism is no panacea.
It cannot replicate the scale or efficiency of global trade, nor can it restore
the predictability on which exporters depend.
Looming
Dangers
The greater danger is the world
drifting into a Kindleberger Trap — a situation in which no power steps forward
to provide the leadership necessary to sustain global public goods, or a stable
trading system.
Economist Charles
Kindleberger’s account of the Great Depression remains instructive: it was not
the presence of conflict but the absence of leadership that brought about the
global economy’s systemic collapse.
Without renewed global
coordination, the economic fragmentation triggered by Trump’s tariff wars could
give way to something far more dangerous than a recession – rising geopolitical
and military tensions that no region can contain.
The political landscape is
already fraught. The Chinese Communist Party, for instance, has long tethered
its legitimacy to the promise of eventual unification with Taiwan. Yet the
costs of using force remain prohibitively high.
Taiwanese President Lai
Ching-te’s recent designation of China as a “foreign hostile force” have
sharpened tensions. Beijing’s response has been calibrated – military exercises
intended more as a warning than a prelude to conflict.
However, the intensifying trade
war with the US may become the final straw that exhausts Beijing’s patience,
leaving Taiwan as collateral damage in a US-China final showdown.
A role for collective
leadership
China alone is neither able nor
inclined to assume the mantle of global leadership. Its current focus is more
on domestic priorities – sustaining economic growth and managing social
stability – than on foreign policy.
Yet, Beijing can still play a
constructive role in shaping the international environment through its
cooperation with Europe, ASEAN and the Global South.
The objective is not to replace
American hegemony, but to support a more multi-polar and collaborative system —
one capable of sustaining global public goods in an era of uncertainty.
Paradoxically, a more
coordinated effort by the rest of the world may ultimately help bring the US
back into the fold. Washington may rediscover the strategic value of engagement
— and return not as the sole leader, but as an indispensable partner.
In the short term, other states
may seek to gain an advantage from the great power standoff. But they should
remember that what begins as a clash between giants can quickly engulf
bystanders.
In this volatile landscape, the
path forward does not lie in exploiting disorder. Rather, nations must
cautiously advance the shared interest in restoring a stable, rules-based
global order.
Kai He, Professor of
International Relations, Griffith University
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